En Afriko la ĝendarmo foriras - The Policeman of Africa Retires

 

French Military Instructors in Chad, photo sourced from the French Ministry of the Army, 25/01/2024

 

Translated from Le Monde Diplomatique

 While Emmanuel Macron's special envoy, former Minister Jean-Marie Bockel gave his report on the reorganisation of the French military disposition at the end of November, Paris was shocked to learn of Senegal and Chad's decision to end their security agreements with the former Colonial power. This new failure marks a turning point for France.

And so there were two less, leaving just three in total. By the 28th of November, in just a few hours France had lost two more positions on the African continent: Senegal, where France has been present for over 200 years, with a current garrison strength of 350 soldiers, and Chad a nation where France established a military presence more than 40 years ago and which stations a thousand soldiers and was until recently the base from which France launched the majority of its international interventions within Africa (six since 1968). Once those, 1350 soldiers withdraw from the region France will have just three bases in Africa - Djibouti, Ivory Coast and Gabon, with a combined force of fewer than 2000 personnel compared to 8500 in 2022.

This is a severe blow for France, whose military and political establishment has already been suffering over the past 3 years. This time the French were not expelled by mass protests, boos and the burning of the blue-white-red flags as happened in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in 2022 and 2023. The retreat was imposed from above. Paris learnt of the new reality in Senegal through newspaper interviews, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye gave to the French media. Although the matter of the withdrawal of the French army was one of the most important demands of his party, the party o African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity (PASTEF), the French optimists hoped he would stall on the question. 

In Chad, the decision announced via an ordinary press statement caused a bombshell, because the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had just left N'Dajemena. At first no one could believe it, because this country was considered as the most important strategic location on the African Continent, a "perfect Aircraft carrier" as one high ranked officer described it, and it was also considered a trusted alliance partner, whose ruling Déby dynasty had many reasons to be grateful to France over the decades due to the support of the French secret services and air force in saving them from being overthrown by military mutinies on multiple occasions. 

For the French Army which has for decades viewed itself as the "Gendarme of Africa" and used the nation since independence in 1960 as a base of operations to launch nearly 40 foreign operations (OPEX) this loss is an historical turning point. It has lost the means and infrastructure to mobilise operations in the region within a few hours notice, as was the case during operation "Serval" in Mali in 2013, launched urgently to prevent an offensive by Jihadist groups.

France Intends to remain "In another form"

In February 2023 President Macron declared his intention not to end the national military presence in Africa but to fundamentally reorganise it. "The logic is that our model is that there should no longer be military bases there as they currently exist" he declared in a speech concerning "Franco-African relations". He announced a major reduction in the number of troops and increased participation with local partners. France had just been driven out of Mali and Burkina Faso by military coups which it had not foreseen. Demonstrations against French influence spread everywhere throughout West Africa. The military and political establishment were (finally!) understanding that a change in relationship was necessary concerning the populations and militaries of the nations concerned, who could no longer tolerate French intrusions. 

After Macron's speech, the military high command and the parliamentary deputies in Macron's camp promised greater "discretion" "a lighter tread" and even a "paradigm shift".... "Now, we have flipped the relationship on its head, now the one who calls the shots is the [African] partner". Said Thierry Buckhard, Army Chief of Staff, speaking to the French parliament in January 2024. Over the following months, the chief of staff worked on new provisions with two necessities; respond to the wishes of the local regimes presented as "partners" and conserve and maintain influence, a difficult balancing act. Under these plans every base except for Djibouti - which has a special status in French strategy and with its 1500 strong garrison is considered indispensable- will drastically reduce its personnel, between 150 and 300 soldiers depending on the base and instead of being given to the host nation will be co-administered by them. "These bases are key to guarding our capability to intervene militarily" explained Deputy Jean-Michael Jacques, Macron supporter and president of the commission for national defence. The remarks come from a report in May 2023. "The strategy presented by the head of state prevents the growing rift that would nullify our military presence in Africa and consequently our influence on the continent"1. 

In a report on French Defence policy by another Deputy, Thomas Gassilloud, repeats the thinking that reigns in Paris "Remain, in another form". According to Gassilloud who is close to the Presidential Palace and served in the army before entering politics, the destiny of France is linked to Africa. That is why it is vital to rebuild "strategic intimacy". "Without a strong reaction, we will face the risk of the degradation of our influence in French-speaking Africa". He underlines 2. When ill winds blow, continued Buckhard, it is necessary to know when to bend, but always with the aim of standing tall again. "We must be capable of quickly shrinking our presence and disappear from the landscape to then restore our presence as needed... [This last] must include the ability to liaise with local militaries and secure strategic access by sea and air".

France can continue to influence the destiny of Africa. It must not "let its hands drop" in the words of General Jerome Pellistrandi in a May 2023 edition of National Defence dedicated to "new relations" between France and Africa. "Quite the opposite" says this senior figure and seasoned debater who regularly appears on television, "more than ever it is necessary to act, but differently... An influence strategy is more necessary now than ever"3. In that same publication another eminent General, Bruno Clement-Bollee, asserted that "it is imperative to react and decide on an ambitious, robust and realistic strategy that will restore to France the status of great nation"4. This is where its international standing lies, above all in its permanent presence on the United Nations Security Council, partly justified by its influence in French-speaking Africa.

The subject of Africa is not solely a question of influence. The French military views the continent as ideal terrain to test its soldiers and equipment, especially in deserts and near desert like environments, offering fringe benefits, career advancement opportunities, shared experiences and adventure. "Our martial culture contains a strong African flavour, affecting our tastes and nostalgia. How will [the new provisions] change the appeal of a military career?" asked right wing Deputy Jean-Louis Thieriot (Republicans) during a discussion by Buckhard inside the National Assembly. It is therefore necessary to reshape the offer of military co-operation, so that what is lost on the one hand is regained through intensive collaboration. That is the indispensable "corollary" according to another of Macron's deputies (and former soldier) Ms. Laetitia Saint-Paul. 

Collaboration was the core of French strategy in the period immediately following independence of the African colonies. It was only from 1970 onwards that direct foreign intervention became the preffered tool of French rulers in resolving political crisis through military means. This period became known as "Jaguar diplomacy" named after the fighter jet that ended service in 1972. This latter period probably ended in 2022 after the disastrous Operation "Barkhane".

Reinvent collaboration or disappear

Now, we arrive at the subject of how to rebuild collaboration and conserving links between the French and local armies; instead of returning sovereignty over the military bases, the idea is to transform them into academies, national schools with a regional objective (ENVR) with the goal of being co-managed by France and the host nation. This project is not new, it dates back to the 1990s. At present nineteen such institutions exist throughout the continent in Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Benin, Gabon and in Cameroon. Combined they are capable of instructing 3000 Non-Commissioned Officers and Cadets annually, and thus foster "intimacy".

Now France plans to rapidly multiply them. That is the task of the Directorate of Security and Defence Co-operation (DCSD), a section under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by an officer and dealing almost exclusively with Africa. Of the 313 collaborators sent abroad most went to Africa, and mainly to the former colonies. On the previous 9th of July the director of the DCSD General Colcombet visited Gabon to inaugarate the opening of School for the administration of Defence Forces in Libreville (EAFDL). This French base also hosts an Academy for environmental protection and natural resources. In his speech Colcombet aluded to "historical evolution" and an "important turning point" in the history of Franco-Gabonese relations. But the goal of these schools is not just to train African militaries; they also must "preserve logistical, human and equipment links to those nations." Jean-Marie Bockel stressed at a meeting with members of the Senate in May 2024. In short, to maintain a foothold abroad in case of need...

A former Minister under Nicholas Sarkozy, who famously declared his willingness "to sign the death warrant of French Africa"5 in 2007, which prompted his dismissal, Mr. Bockel has been interested in these matters for some time. His son, a soldier, was killed in Mali in 2019. In 2024 Macron appointed him "special envoy" tasked with study the reorganisation of the disposition of the French Army in Africa. His task was to liaise with the concerned heads of state and draft a list of proposals which he submitted just three days before the announcements of Senegal and Chad. The choice of appointment of Mr. Bockel followed a certain kind of logic; in 2013 while a Senator he and his colleague Jeanny Lorgeaux wrote a report "on France's presence in coveted Africa" which summarised the current priorities well. "It is our duty to be there" the report says, "because we are betting a part of our future growth in Africa" While they advised "giving an African meaning to the French presence in Africa" both Senators concluded that the remaining 8 military bases "should be maintained"6.

It was a different era then. France had just launched Operation "Serval" in Mali, with military success and the support of the majority of the African states, and was preparing to launch Operation "Sangaris" in Central Africa. France had a certain grand reputation then. Eleven years later and it looks like a relic of the past. By trying to "re-invent military partnerships instead of demilitarising Franco-Africa realtions" researcher Thierry Vircoloun explains, "the government attempted to carry out half measures which pleased no one"7. Its military presence may become an important issue during the Presidential elections in Gabon, where the Bongo family were ousted in a Coup in 2023, and in the Ivory Coast, both elections are schedule for 2025, it is possible that the French Army will be expelled from both countries as well.

Remi Carayol

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1: Jean-Michel Jacques, Report made on behalf of the committee on national defense and the armed forces on the draft law relating to the military budget for the years 2024 to 2030, and containing various decisions on national defense, n°1234, National Assembly, May 12, 2023.

 2: Thomas Gassilloud, Information report on the hearings of the committee on French defense policy in Africa, n°2461, National Assembly, April 10, 2024.

3: Jérôme Pellistrandi, «A falling tree makes more noise than a growing forest,” Revue Défense nationale, n° 860, Paris, May 2023.

 4: Bruno Clément-Bollée, “France, becoming a true balancing power again”, Revue Défense nationale, n° 860, Parizo, majo 2023.

 5: A term that defines France's neocolonial relations with Africa. (TT)

6: Jeanny Lorgeoux and Jean-marie Bockel, report made on behalf of the committee on foreign affairs, defense and the armed forces on France's presence in coveted Africa, n°104, French Senate, Paris, October 29, 2013.

 7: Thierry Vircoulon, "The dilemma of the Franco-African military relationship: reinvent or turn the page?", French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), November 18, 2024.